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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NELLIE ALEXANDRA HANSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ; 
vs. 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. 
i Case No. 89-0249 CA 
i Priority No. 14(b) 
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
ACTING AS AMICUS CURIAE 
JURISDICTION; NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a District Court order in a domestic 
relations case. This Court has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1989), as 
amended. 
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
The Public Support of Children Act, in § 62A-11-3Q2, Utah 
Code Annotated (Supp. 1988), sets forth the broad public policy 
that "children shall be maintained form the resources of 
responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in 
part, the burden often borne by the general citizenry through 
public assistance programs." If parents fail to support their 
children, the State of Utah, Department of Social Services (the 
"Department") is often called upon to provide moneys for the 
support of those children, at taxpayer expense. 
Whenever a parent is legally relieved of his obligation to 
support his child, this takes away the right of the Department to 
seek to cause him to contribute toward the support of that child* 
It causes the taxpayers to absorb a greater public assistance 
expense than they might otherwise have to bear. The Department 
recognizes that there are occasions when circumstances justify 
the extraordinary step of relieving a parent of his parental 
rights and obligations. The Department submits, however, that 
this should take place only in exceptional circumstances and only 
after legal requirements for the termination of parental rights 
and obligations have been strictly complied with. 
The Department believes that if the order of the District 
Court were sustained on appeal, the door would open for parents 
to enter into private agreements to terminate parental rights and 
obligations , and to seek court approval thereof without making 
the child a party or otherwise watching out for the interests of 
the child. Such agreements are inherently suspect, and something 
as important as the termination of a parent's rights and 
obligations should not be able to accomplished in that manner. 
Such a result would not be in the best interests of the minor 
children living in the State of Utah and it would be adverse to 
the financial interests of the taxpayers as well. 
For these reasons the Department is vitally interested in 
this appeal and is submitting this brief on behalf of the 
appellant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. What is the legal effect of the stipulation and order 
which purport to terminate the parental rights and obligations of 
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the respondent (the "father") toward his daughter, the appellant 
(the "child")? 
2. Does the child in this case have a cause of action 
against her father for support, notwithstanding the stipulation 
between her father and mother (to which she was not a party), and 
the order approving it? 
3. Did the District Court have jurisdiction to terminate 
the rights and duties of the father toward his child? 
4. Would it be consistent with the principles of equal 
protection of the laws if parents of illegitimate children were 
allowed to irrevocably terminate the obligations of the fathers 
toward their children? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE 
The following constitutional provisions are determinative in 
this case: 
Amendment XIVf Section 1, United States Constitution: 
. . . [N]or shall any State . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 2, Constitution of Utah 
All political power is inherent in the 
people; and all free governments are founded 
on their authority for their equal protection 
and benefit. . . . 
The following statutes are the determinative in this case: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16(f) (1987): 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the 
[juvenile] court has exclusive original jurisdiction 
in proceedings . . . to terminate the legal parent-
child relationship, including termination of 
residual parental rights and duties as defined. . • . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of two cases which were consolidated below 
(R. 164). The first case (No. 86-CV-354-U) was a petition for 
determination of paternity filed in 1986 by Carlisle Stuart 
Fauver against Patti Jill Hansen (the "mother"), who is the 
mother of Nellie Alexandra Hansen, the appellant (R. 1). That 
case resulted in a stipulation between Carlisle Stuart Fauver and 
the mother, approved by order of the court, that Mr. Fauver was 
the father of the child (R. 5, 8). The stipulation and order 
purport to terminate the father's parental rights and duties 
toward the child. Copies of said stipulation and order are 
included in the Appendix herein, as Exhibits "A" and "B," 
respectively. 
In 1988, the mother filed a petition to modify that order, 
seeking an order that the father be required to provide support 
for the child (R. 11). 
The second case was an independent action for support (No. 
88-CV-270-U) filed in 1988 by the child, through her guardian ad 
litem, against the father (R. 93). 
Following consolidation of the cases the District Court held 
a hearing and subsequently rendered a memorandum decision (R. 
77), dated March 17, 1989, followed by a formal Order of 
Dismissal (R. 80), dated April 10, 1989. The order determined 
that the child Nellie Hansen has no right to support from her 
father Carlisle Stuart Fauver. The memorandum decision and order 
of dismissal are included in the Appendix herein as Exhibits "C" 
and "D,M respectively. 
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The child, by and through her guardian ad litemf filed this 
appeal on April 27, 1989 (R. 84). This court subsequently-
granted an order authorizing the State Department of Social 
Services to file a brief as amicus curiae. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Nellie Alexandra Hansen was born to Patti Jill Hansen and 
Carlisle Stuart Fauver on July 9, 1986 (R. 5). On October 2, 
1986, the father and mother filed a stipulation with the Seventh 
(now Eighth) Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County, 
State of Utah (R. 5). This stipulation was submitted with an 
accompanying order approving the stipulation (R. 8). The court 
approved the stipulation and signed the order on October 2, 1986, 
the same day it was filed (R. 8). The child was not a party to 
any of these proceedings. 
The stipulation and order establish that Carlisle Stuart 
Fauver is the father of the child. They also purport to 
terminate all of the father's parental rights and obligations, 
including the obligation to support the child. 
Tiie mother and the child (through a guardian ad litem) 
subsequently filed various legal proceedings in an attempt to 
obtain support from the father, on the grounds that the child was 
in need of support from her father (R. 11, 93). The District 
Court denied the requested relief on the basis that the 
stipulation and order signed in 1986 terminated the father's 
obligation to support the child, and that the child was bound 
thereby (R. 80). This appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The agreement between the mother and the fatherf and 
the order approving it, purporting to terminate the father's 
obligation to support his child, are void on the grounds that a 
parent's duty to support his minor child cannot be alienated by 
any action of the parents. The Utah Supreme Court has held on 
several occasions that a parent may not bargain away the 
obligation of support. The Court has further held that the right 
to support is the child's right, and not the right of the 
custodial parent. Since the child was not a party to the 
stipulation, she is not bound by it, and may pursue, through her 
guardian ad litem, her own support claim. 
The stipulation and the district court's order pursuant 
thereto are also void because their effect was to terminate the 
father's parental rights and duties with respect to the child. 
Utah's statutes make it clear that jurisdiction to terminate 
parental rights rests exclusively in the juvenile court, and that 
correct procedure must be followed. The district court lacked 
jurisdiction over the matter of parental rights termination and 
failed to follow the appropriate procedure. 
Finally, for the court to give effect to the 
stipulation and order would work a denial of the child's right to 
Equal Protection under Amendment 14, Section 1 of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Sections 2 and 24 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. Utah law provides that an 
illegitimate child has no less right to support than a child born 
in a marriage. Given that a child support order entered incident 
to a divorce is always modifiable upon a showing of changed 
circumstances, it would be harsh and inequitable to hold the 
appellant child to the terms of an agreement to which she was not 
a party, simply because she was born out of wedlock. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FATHER HAS AN OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT HIS DAUGHTER 
AND SHE HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HIM FOR HER SUPPORT. 
HIS AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY AND THE ORDER APPROVING 
IT SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS AGAINST UTAH LAW 
AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 
The Utah Code expresses the duty of a parent to provide 
for his offspring in unequivocal language: "Every man shall 
support his child. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987). 
Utah statutes contain other references to the parental support 
duty as well. The Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act 
provides in § 78-45-4.2 that "Nothing contained herein shall act 
to relieve the natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary 
obligation of support. ..." (emphasis added). Another statute 
sets forth the policy underlying the Public Support of Children 
Act: "It is declared to be the public policy of this state that 
this chapter be liberally construed and administered to the end 
that children shall be maintained from the resources of 
responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in 
part, the burden often borne by the general citizenry through 
welfare programs." § 62A-11-302, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 
1988). Since the statutes are so explicit, the conclusion is 
inescapable that the duty to support one's children is a 
necessary concomitant of parenthood. 
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As the Utah Supreme Court has writtenf "the duty of 
parents to support their children derives from natural law. This 
has been recognized from the earliest times as a proposition of 
such incontestable correctness that it is neither subject to 
doubt nor in need of explanatory justification; and this is 
equally true of the corresponding right of a child to receive 
support from his father." State Div. of Family Services v. 
Clark, 554 P.2d 1310, 1311 (1976)- The Court in Clark 
characterized the duty of support as "continuing and 
inalienable." Id. 
The child support obligation persists even when the 
parents have taken steps to eliminate it. In Gulley v. Gulley, 
570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977), the Court considered the case of a 
divorced couple who had entered into a contract providing that 
the father would be released from his financial obligations under 
the divorce decree upon his payment of a lump sum. The Court 
held that while "[s]he and her husband were at liberty to bargain 
with respect to his obligations to her," the father could not 
contract out of his child support duty. The Court echoed its 
holding in Clark: "Every parent has the duty to support the 
children he has brought into the world. The duty is inalienable 
and he cannot rid himself of it by purporting to transfer it to 
someone else, by contract or otherwise." Gulley, 570 P.2d at 
128-9. 
A similar holding was reached in Baqqs v. Anderson, 528 
P.2d 141 (Utah 1974). There, the Court noted that an agreement 
by the parents removing the father's support duty had no effect 
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on the rights of the child to support from his parents: "[A 
father] cannot divest himself of that obligation, nor defeat the 
child's right to support." Icl. at 143. In Hills v. Hills, 638 
P.2d 516, 517 (1981), a later case also involving an attempt by 
stipulation to renounce the father's duty of child support, the 
Court wrote, "[tjhere is no merit to the contention that the 
parents' stipulation effectively teirminated the father's parental 
obligations. The right to support from the parents belongs to 
the minor children and is not subject to being bartered away, 
extinguished, estopped, or in any way defeated by the agreement 
or conduct of the parents" (citations omitted). See also, Race 
v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987) (holding that a child's right 
to support is his own), and Hansen v. Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1979) (holding that the right to support is the right of 
the children themselves). 
It is manifest from the Court's holdings that a father 
cannot relieve himself of his obligation of child support by 
agreement with the child's mother. In addition to the fact that 
the duty is not subject to repudiation, it is elementary law that 
an agreement between two parties cannot rescind a third party's 
rights. In Gulley, 570 P.2d at 129, the Court wrote that "the 
minor children who are the beneficiaries of this duty were not 
parties to the agreement and they could not be bound thereby." 
(In its memorandum decision, at R. 78-79, the district 
court expressed a concern that recognizing that children have an 
independent right to support from their parents would mean that 
guardians ad litem would have to be appointed for the children in 
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every divorce and paternity case. The Department respectfully 
submits that even if such were the consequence, children do have 
such an independent right in this State, as demonstrated herein, 
and the district court failed to follow the law in making its 
ruling. But the Department further submits that the district 
court's concerns on this point are unwarranted, because parents 
in every divorce and paternity case do not try to terminate the 
father's child support obligation, as happened in this case. It 
is relatively uncommon for parents to attempt such a thing. Thus 
it would be similarly uncommon that a guardian ad litem would 
have to be appointed to represent the interests of the children 
involved.) 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Gerhardt v. Estate of 
Moore, 441 N.W.2d 734 (1989), found constitutional problems with 
a state statute that permitted unmarried parents to relieve 
themselves of their support obligations by contract. See Point 
III of Argument, infra. But aside from constitutional concerns, 
the court found a practical reason to refuse to give effect to 
the parents' agreement. As the court noted, "denying nonmarital 
children the ability to obtain additional child support from 
their fathers regardless of future circumstances could itself 
result in an increased burden on the state welfare system." Id. 
at 739. 
The Gerhardt court's reasoning is directly applicable 
in this case. It is unjust to shift the burden of providing 
support for minor children to third parties, including the State. 
Both the legislature and the courts have expressed intent that 
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the primary obligation of child support belongs to parents. In 
the instant case, the father is attempting to rely on an 
agreement exactly of the sort held invalid on numerous occasions 
by the Utah Supreme Court—an agreement to which the child was 
not a party. 
It should make no difference that the father and mother 
submitted their stipulation to the court and obtained approval 
thereof. As is explained in Point II of the Argument, infra, the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the father's 
parental rights. Even if the parties had been before the proper 
court for such a purpose, they failed to follow the proper 
procedures for terminating parental rights. There is no legal 
basis for the court to approve the type of settlement that 
occurred in this case. Section 78-45a-13, Utah Code Annotated 
(1987), which deals with settlement agreements in paternity 
cases, says that "An agreement of settlement with the alleged 
father is binding only when approved by the court." This section 
is found in the very statute which provides for the establishment 
of paternity and the establishment of the support obligations of 
the father of an illegitimate child. The Legislature surely 
could not have intended that this section ever be used to justify 
the entry of an order terminating the parental obligations of a 
father who has just been (in the same order!) judicially 
determined to be the father of a child born out of wedlock. 
For the reasons given above, the stipulation and order 
should be held void. It was error for the lower court to hold 
that child may not maintain her own cause of action. The 
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district court erred in giving effect to the stipulation and 
order. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO 
TERMINATE THE FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 
As defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(21) (1987), 
termination of parental rights "means the permanent elimination 
of all parental rights and duties, including residual parental 
rights and dutiesf by court order." Residual rights and duties 
are those remaining with the parent after legal custody "has 
vested in another person or agency, including, but not limited 
to, the responsibility for support, the right to consent to 
adoption, the right to determine the child's religious 
affiliation, and the right to reasonable visitation unless 
restricted by the court " Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(18), 
emphasis added. 
It is clear that the 1986 court order in this case was 
intended to terminate the parental rights and obligations of the 
father. For example, the order includes the following provision 
in paragraph 8: "Petitioner hereby forever waives and disclaims 
any right accruing under the parent-child relationship between 
him and [his] minor child." (R. 9). The order further provides 
that the father "shall not be held legally or financially 
responsible for the minor child, and respondent [Patti Jill 
Hansen] waives all future child support payments or any other 
form of support from petitioner." Ld. at paragraph 6. In 
addition, the father specifically waived all future claims to 
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custody and visitation, and agreed that any petition for the 
adoption of the child could be granted without his participation, 
and without any notice to him. Id. at paragraphs 2, 4, and 9. 
Finally, the first paragraph of the order also indicates that the 
father had signed in open court a "Consent to Termination of 
Parental Rights." (R. 9) That Consent is found on page 3 of the 
record. 
Utah law provides that the Utah Juvenile Court "has 
exclusive, original jurisdiction in proceedings: . . . (f) to 
terminate the legal parent-child relationship, including 
termination of residual parental rights and duties as defined." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16 (1987). At § 78-3a-48 (2), the statute 
specifies that "[a] termination of parental rights may be ordered 
only after a hearing is held specifically on the question of 
terminating the rights of the parent or parents." Even in a case 
where a parent voluntarily requests termination, the juvenile 
court must still make a finding that termination is in the best 
interests of both the parent and the child. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-48(5) 
In J.CO. v, Anderson, 734 P.2d 458 (1987), a Utah 
district court had acquired jurisdiction in an adoption 
proceeding filed by the foster parents of two minor children. 
While that adoption proceeding was pending, the State filed a 
separate proceeding in juvenile court to terminate the parental 
rights of the natural parents, who had abandoned the children. 
The juvenile court terminated the natural parents' parental 
rights, and they then appealed, claiming the juvenile court 
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lacked jurisdiction to do so. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
although the district court had jurisdiction over the adoption 
petition, only the juvenile court had jurisdiction in the matter 
of termination of the natural parents' rights. 
The case of Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981), 
is directly applicable to the instant proceeding. Hills involved 
a divorced mother and father who executed in district court prior 
to their divorce a stipulation according to which the father 
relinquished all rights to the parties' children. No provision 
was made for child support. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 
children's right to support could not be defeated by the conduct 
of the parents, and that the stipulation had no effect. The 
Court further held that "[i]f parental rights and obligations are 
to be terminated, this must be done by court decree in the manner 
prescribed by law." After noting the Utah Code's requirement 
that specific procedures must be followed, the Court wrote that 
"the drastic remedy of termination of parental duties cannot be 
validly decreed—with or without stipulation—without a hearing 
devoted to this question and including the submission of evidence 
and careful judicial consideration of all of the interests 
involved, including the child's." Ld. at 517, emphasis in 
original• 
These authorities show that the district court exceeded 
its authority by entering the order, the effect of which was to 
terminate the father's rights and duties. Since the district 
court lacked jurisdiction and failed to follow correct procedure 
in any event, the stipulation and order are void. 
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POINT III 
UPHOLDING THE ORDER AND STIPULATION WOULD DISCRIMINATE 
AGAINST THE CHILD ON THE BASIS OF HER ILLEGITIMACY 
AND DENY HER THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION. 
If the Plaintiff had been born to married parents who 
later divorcedf there is no doubt that any child support order 
contained in her parents' divorce decree could be modified as 
reasonable and necessary under the parties' circumstances. Under 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5, the court granting the divorce retains 
continuing jurisdiction over matters of child support. In 
Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303f 1305 (1980), the Court noted 
that "[u]nder Utah law, a divorce court sits as a court in equity 
so far as child custody, support payments, and the like are 
concerned. It likewise retains continuing jurisdiction over the 
parties, and power to make equitable redistribution or other 
modification of the original decree as equity might dictate." 
The court's power to modify child support obligations 
persists even when no child support is awarded in the original 
decree. In Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court maintained that "[t]he fact that one parent is not 
currently required to pay support to the other neither terminates 
the child's right nor obviates the parent's responsibility for 
such support as may be determined at some future time." Ijd. at 
394, citations omitted. 
In light of the protection that children born in 
wedlock enjoy with regard to the assurance of parental support, 
it seems unjustly discriminatory to foreclose the appellant 
child's right to support because of her parents' earlier 
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agreement. By upholding the agreement, the district court 
withheld from her a source of support to which she would have 
been entitled if she had been born in a marriage—in effect, 
punishing the child for the fact that her parents were not 
married. 
It is noteworthy that Utah's statutes make it clear 
that the child support obligation is not diminished by the fact 
that a child was born out of wedlock. Section 78-45a-l states 
that M[t]he father of a child which is or may be born out of 
wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a child 
born in wedlock . . . for the education, necessary support and 
funeral expenses of the child. . . . " (emphasis added) The 
District Court's action was contrary to notions of equal 
protection as codified in the pertinent Utah statutes. 
The District Court's action is also contrary to Article 
I, § 2 of the Utah State Constitution and Amendment 14, § 1 of 
the United States Constitution. The Utah provision states: "All 
political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit . . . ." By the terms of the Federal 
Constitution, "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a case remanded from 
the U.S. Supreme Court for further consideration in light of 
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. — , 108 S. Ct. 1910, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465 
(1988), recently addressed the equal protection issues raised by 
the practice of upholding agreements in which an unmarried father 
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attempts to divest himself of his child support obligations by 
agreement with the mother. Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 441 
N.W.2d 734 (1989)- While that court dealt with (and ultimately 
invalidated) a statutory scheme that allowed such agreements, the 
court's reasoning was applicable to the instant case. The 
Wisconsin court held that it is unfair, as well as 
unconstitutional, for nonmarital (but not marital) children to be 
barred from seeking increases in support amounts, regardless of 
their need: "Upholding this inability to seek additional support 
from their fathers would deprive [plaintiff] and certain other 
nonmarital children of something which marital children have 
always had, . . . namely the right to seek support from both 
their parents during the whole of their minority." Ld. at 738. 
In the case at hand, it was inconsistent with the 
principles of equal protection for the district court to have 
upheld the agreement between the child's mother and father. The 
lower court erred in maintaining that the child may not obtain 
support from her father, even if it means modifying the 1986 
order which absolved him of any child support obligations. To 
hold otherwise would be tantamount to an acceptance of the 
proposition that children born to unwed parents are not entitled 
to the same economic protections marital children enjoy—a 
proposition clearly contrary to existing law and the principles 
of equal protection. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Department respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the order of the district courtf hold that the 
stipulation and order terminating the father's support obligation 
are void as a matter of law, hold that the child has an 
independent cause of action for support from her father, and 
remand the matter to the district court for a determination of an 
appropriate support obligation for the father towards the 
appellant child. 
DATED this 31 day of August, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
BLAINE R. FERGUSON U 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PATTI JILL HANSEN, 
Respondent. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No.^£(/3>^V~6C 
Carlisle Stuart Fauver, the petitioner, and Patti 
Jill Hansen, the respondent, having duly considered what is in 
the best interests of Nellie Alexandra Hansen, the minor child 
of the parties, and desiring to create a healthy environment 
in which the minor child can grow, hereby stipulate and agree 
as follows: 
1. Carlisle Stuart Fauver and Patti Jill Hansen are 
the natural parents of the minor child, Nellie Alexandra 
Hansen (hereafter referred to as "Alex", born July 9, 1986). 
2. Permanent custody of the child shall be granted 
to the respondent. Petitioner agrees that any claims to 
custody by him or anyone claiming through him are forever 
waived. 
EXHIBIT A 
3. The petitioner forfeits all legal rights to the 
child, and makes no claias as parent for any purpose included 
but not limited to an income tax deduction. 
4* The petitioner agrees to make no demands to spend 
time with the child* The parties agree this does not forbid 
interaction between father and daughter, but any such 
interaction requires complete approval from the mother. 
5. In the event of the death of respondent, custody 
of the child shall be transferred to the party designated by 
respondent, or to the maternal grandparents if no designation 
has been made. Petitioner waives any right to challenge said 
transfer of custody. 
6« The petitioner shall not be held legally or 
financially responsible for the minor child and the respondent 
agrees to waive all future child support payments or any other 
form of support from petitioner. 
7. The petitioner agrees that contemporeanously with 
this Stipulation, he will execute in open Court a consent to 
adoption and waiver of parental rights. Said consent will 
provide that petitioner will not object to the adoption of 
said minor child and that the respondent has no obligation to 
inform petitioner of said adoption. 
8o At his discretion, petitioner may establish a 
financial arrangement he feels is appropriate to insure some 
measure of future financial security for the minor child. 
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9. Any and all obligations between petitioner and 
respondent that may have arisen as a result of the birth of 
the minor child that have not been resolved by this agreement 
shall be terminated. 
DATED this j Q day of September, 1986. 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER' PATTI JILL HANSEN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SSt 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN before me this /? day of 
September, 1986. 
^/t^/A(/f!i4<</iU 
NOTARY PUBLIC , 
My commission expires: Residing at:^c£'Jftuffcs-uy 
. i . 
L. A. DBVBR. #0875 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for petitioner 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Dtah 84078 
Telephonet 789-1666 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER, : 
Petitioner, : O R D E R 
vs. : 
PATTI JILL HANSEN, : Civil No. 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled action came on regularly for 
hearing this 2d day of October, 1986f before the Honorable 
Richard C. Davidson. Petitioner appeared in person and was 
represented by counsel, L. A* Dever. Defendant did not appear 
in person or through counsel* A Stipulation entered into 
between the parties was presented to the Court. The Court 
having approved said stipulation and having heard testimony of 
petitioner, and petitioner having signed in open Court a 
Consent to Termination of Parental Rights, and being fully 
advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Carlisle Stuart Fauver and Patti Jill Hansen are 
the natural parents of the minor child, Nellie Alexandra 
Hansen, born July 9, 1986. 
OCT 2 1985 
Outiutnr LUUK CLERK 
EXHIBIT B 
2. Permanent custody of said minor child is hereby 
awarded to Patti Jill Hansen. Any claims to custody by 
petitioner or anyone claiming through him are forever waived. 
3. Petitioner forfeits all legal rights to the 
child, and makes no claim as parent for any purpose including, 
but not limited to, an income tax deduction. 
4. Petitioner is ordered to make no demands to spend 
time with the child. Any interaction between father and 
daughter must be upon the complete approval of defendant. 
5. In the event of the death of respondent, custody 
of the child is ordered to be transferred to the party 
designated by respondent or to the maternal grandparents if 
no designation has been made. Petitioner waives any right to 
challenge said transfer of custody. 
6. Petitioner shall not be held legally or 
financially responsible for the minor child and the respondent 
waives all future child support payments or any other form of 
support from petitioner, 
7. Petitioner may, at his discretion, establish a 
financial arrangement he feels is appropriate to insure some 
measure of future financial security for the minor child. 
8. Petitioner hereby forever waives and disclaims 
any right accuring under the parent-child relationship between 
him and said minor child. 
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9. Petitioner hereby waives any notice or service 
upon him of any petition for adoption involving Nellie 
Alexandra Hansen and said adoption may be granted without his 
participation. 
10. Any and all obligations between petitioner and 
respondent that may have arisen as a result of the birth of 
the minor child that have not been resolved are hereby 
terminated. 
DATED this fl?^ day of October, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVERf 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PATTI JILL HANSEN, 
Defendant* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 86-CV-354U 
This matter is before the court for consideration of the 
claim of Nellie Alexandra Hansen (herein "the child") for support 
against her father, Carlisle Stuart Fauver (herein "Fauver"). In 
1986, Fauver filed a paternity action to determine his rights and 
responsibilities regarding the child and her mother, Patti Jill 
Hansen (herein "Hansen")• In that action, Fauver and Hansen 
entered into a stipulation in which Fauver gave up any rights 
regarding the child, and Hansen "waived all future child support 
payments or any other form of support from petitioner" (Fauver). 
Stipulation, page 2, paragraph 6. A court order was entered in 
accordance with the terms of the stipulation. 
On November 21, 1988, the child through her guardian ad 
litem, filed an independent action for support, claiming that 
she was not bound by the terms of the stipulation and order 
because she was not a party to the previous action. On 
December 5, 1988, Hansen filed a petition to modify the order 
EXHIBIT C 
originally entered, claiming a substantial change of circum-
stances. The two actions were then consolidated for determination 
of the issues. 
Prior to consolidation, the child filed a Motion for Temporar 
Support, and after consolidation, filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Fauver responded with a Motion to Dismiss for falure 
to state a cause of action. Oral arguments on the pending motions 
were heard on March 7, 1989. 
Hansen and the child ask the court to declare that the 
stipulation is void as against public policy, and/or that the 
child may maintain the independent cause of action. Fauver 
alleges that the stipulation and order are binding upon Hansen 
and the child, and that there has been no change of circum-
stance to warrant any amendment to the order. 
Having carefully considered the pleadings, memoranda and. 
oral arguments, the court rules as follows: 
(1) The stipulation and the order based thereon 
entered into between Fauver and Hansen are not void as against 
public policy. If the agreement and order provided, or the 
subsequent facts indicated that the child was left without any 
support, the agreement could perhaps be voided. However, the 
agreement provides that Hansen will have exclusive custody of 
the child. Thus, Hansen assumed the responsibility for the 
care as well as the custody of the child. 
(2) The child may not maintain a separate cause of 
action for support. To allow such actions after one of the 
natural parents had entered into an agreement for, or had been 
awarded an order of support for the benefit of the child, has 
the potential of creating chaos in the area of domestic relations 
law. At the very least, each paternity action, or divorce action 
involving children would require the appointment of the parent 
or another as guardian ad litem to insure that such actions 
would not arise years after all other litigation was completed. 
For this reason, the court rules as stated above. 
(3) If Hansen is to have any cause of action for 
child support, she must at least, show a significant change of 
circumstances. However, the court is not convinced that the 
order herein based upon this particular stipulation is subject 
to modification. Counsel is invited to submit memoranda on 
that point. If the court finds it is subject to modification, 
an evidentiary hearing will be held on that point. 
(4) Based on the foregoing rulings, the motion for 
summary judgment is denied, the motion for temporary support is 
denied, and the motion for dismissal is denied without 
prejudice. 
DATED this day of March, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
"—T 
cc: Harry H. Souvall 
Ron Nehring 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH UINTAH COUNTY 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PATTI JILL HANSEN, 
Defendant, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 86-CV-354 U 
NELLIE ALEXANDRA HANSEN, by 
and through her Guardian Ad 
Litem, Nancy Olsen, Maternal 
Aunt, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARLISLE STUART FAUVER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 88-CV-270-U 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court 
on March 7, 1989 for oral arguments and hearing on the 
motion of Carlisle Stuart Fauver to dismiss the complaint of 
Nellie Alexandra Hansen for failure to state a cause of 
action, the Hon. Dennis Draney, Judge presiding, Carlisle 
Stuart Fauver being represented by his counsel, Harry H. 
Souvall and the minor child Nellie Alexandra Hansen by and 
through her guardian ad litem being represented by Ron 
Neerings, the Court having reviewed the file and the 
pleadings therein, having heard the arguments and 
representations of respective counsel, the Court having 
EXlfrBIT D 
taken the matter under advisement and having issued a 
memorandum decision, based thereon and for good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
complaint of the minor child, Nellie Alexandra Hansen, as 
against Carlisle Stuart Fauver should be and hereby is 
dismissed as no cause of action, the Court finding and 
determining that the child may not maintain a separate cause 
of action for support from her natural father when there has 
previously been a resolution of the child support obligation 
between the parents; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that as to the minor child Nellie 
Alexandra Hansen the stipulation and agreement by which 
Patti Jill Hansen gave up any claim of child support against 
Carlisle Stuart Fauver is not void as against public policy; 
further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
order of dismissal shall constitute a final judgment as it 
resolves all pending issues between Nellie Alexandra Hansen, 
her guardian ad litem and Carlisle Stuart Fauver, and this 
Court finds and determines that this order of is an 
appealable order. 
-Hf\ 
DATED this |D day oflj£r6h, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
mkPl. DEMS'/L  DRAMET" 
JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL to: 
HARRY H. SOUVALL 
McRAE & DELAND 
Attorneys for Fauver 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
on the J£9th day of March, 1989,, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
JRIAN W. BARMRD 
Attorney for Minor Chirld 
